Special CIO (chief investment officer) Outsourcing Edition
1. Investment Outsourcing: a view from the bottom up (the intro)
2. Outsourcing for beginners: a conversation with Ball State CIO Tom Heck
3. Ball State, U North Dakota, Mt Holyoke – Compare, contrast and compute: Two virgin outsourcers and one veteran
4. Skorina’s Ultimate Outsourcer List
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Investment Outsourcing: A view from the bottom up
There’s lots of information out there – or at least a lot of talk – about investment outsourcing (aka “CIO outsourcing,” aka “implemented consulting,” etc). Unfortunately, almost all of it comes from the people who are selling outsourcing services.
There’s nothing wrong with marketing, but I thought it would be useful to look at outsourcing from the customer’s point of view for a change. So, here are a couple of mini-case-studies: two roughly similar endowments – Ball State University and University of North Dakota – who both hired outsourcers this year, and how they did it.
For contrast, I also take a brief look at another endowment – Mount Holyoke College – which was an early adopter of the outsourcing model, and how they have fared.
In addition, and at no extra charge, I’ve compiled my own list of outsourcers, phoning around to get the best and latest AUM numbers I can find. There are other lists out there, but some are behind pay-walls or aren’t quite up to date. Mine includes a few firms I haven’t seen elsewhere, and is both fresh and free.
In a future report, I turn the coin over and look at some smaller funds which are deliberately and defiantly un-outsourced, and doing very well, thank you.
We’ll be back soon with a regular, less pedantic version of the Letter.
Oh, and if you decide you need a CIO instead of an outsourcer, my line is always open.
CAS
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Outsourcing for beginners: A conversation with Ball State University’s Tom Heck
As of July, 2011, the Ball State University Foundation in Muncie, Indiana has hired the Agility unit of Perella Weinberg Partners to manage their $160 million endowment.
Agility’s team is headed by Chris Bittman, former chief investment officer of the University of Colorado Foundation, who joined Agility in 2009.
I had a chance recently to talk to Ball State chief investment officer Tom Heck about how they made their decision.
Skorina: Tom, thanks for talking to me about how you worked through this process.
When did you first start looking at outsourcing and how long did it take to pick a vendor?
Heck: We started talking about it in the spring of 2010, then appointed a task force at our November meeting. It’s taken us about a year, all told.
Skorina: Was there some specific catalyst that pushed you into action?
Heck: No, we just had a growing awareness that we couldn’t keep operating the same way in a different world. We had a big committee that met three times a year with a consultant bringing us allocation and manager recommendations. That was fine for managing a basic, long-term portfolio in a “normal” market. But, for a more complex portfolio in a “new normal” market,” not so much.
Dial those in and we just didn’t have the resources to effectively manage $160 million with a one-man investment office. We needed back-up, not just advice, and we were hearing that outsourcing might meet our needs.
An endowment should take a long-term view, but the world doesn’t always give you that luxury. Now, you need to constantly evaluate investment strategies, risks and opportunities, money managers, trading options, and back-office systems. Even with the help of a good consultant, we didn’t have the horsepower.
We needed a way to move faster, more tactically, to adapt to changing markets. And we needed access to a more sophisticated risk-management process.
Here’s a couple of questions we were asking ourselves:
Since 2009, tail-risk hedging is something our board has thought about. If we conclude that the market is especially risky, then exactly how would we hedge ourselves? What would it cost, and how would we manage the hedging mechanism? We don’t know.
But an outsourcer should have the experience, methodology, and resources to get it done. If they do, we would want to give them that discretion.
Or, suppose we think some theme like the rise of the Chinese middle class represents big growth and investment opportunities. How do we monetize that conclusion? How does a small fund get access to those markets at a reasonable cost? ETFs? Companies? Commodities? Maybe some specialty funds? These are complicated questions.
Skorina: What was your first impression, once you jumped in and started calling vendors?
Heck: Mostly, confusion. It is a rapidly growing, evolving marketplace.
In theory, it’s a two-step problem. First we had to decide exactly what outsourcing model would work for us. Our committee was leaning toward keeping an investment officer on campus – that would be me! – we wanted a process that could complement our existing setup instead of replacing it.
Then, we had to decide which specific firm could give us what we wanted in terms of both cost-effectiveness and general comfort level.
In practice, though, we had to sort of do both things at once as we worked through our learning curve.
We learned right away that it’s hard to get impartial advice about this stuff. Most traditional consultants are looking at the outsourcing business themselves, or are already managing some money. They aren’t neutral advisors. Their fees are being squeezed, and they want to generate more income. And, of course, they don’t want to lose a client, so it’s a touchy question for them.
Then, once we began talking to firms, they seemed to fall into three broad camps.
First, there’s the group that comes out of the university endowment world. They understand multi-asset-class portfolios, the ebb and flows of donations, the school budget process, and the bureaucratic frictions. They spoke our language, and that’s where we ultimately ended up.
The second group is the traditional consultants. As I said, they’re getting hammered on all sides and most of them have already launched or are trying to develop a money-management group. At the same time, many are merging into mega-firms. The acquiring firms, up on top of the food chain, mostly come from the pension consulting world. That’s understandable, since the total AUM is much bigger in that category. There are some similarities, but also a lot of differences. It’s a culture of actuaries and liability management. That’s not us. We have different risks and different time horizons.
Then there are the big, full-service financial-services guys: commercial banks, investment banks, and the giant money managers. That’s a world driven by fees and transaction income. It’s not the world of patient, long-term money. So we chose not to go there.
Skorina: This has been a long quest for you guys, hasn’t it?
Heck: Charles, I’m afraid I’m just getting started!
Even in the E&F crowd, which is where we ended up, there’s still a whole menagerie of different investment philosophies.
Some preach strategic asset allocation with rigorous rebalancing. Others believe in the eventual reversion to the historical mean.
That’s the “we think these securities are historically undervalued and will revert accordingly” group. They talk about underweighting or overweighting and a return to “normal,” whatever that is.
Still others say: forget conventional risk measurement and mean reversion and focus on deep risk assessment. Fine, but how are we going to make money?
Another group, which intrigued us, invests in a global-thematic manner. They think more like a global macro hedge fund, but with a longer-term perspective.
In the end, we felt the most important thing was not specific investment theories, but dealing with people who came from our world and understood our challenges and concerns. If we talk the same language, we’re confident we can arrive at a common view of the world regarding risk and return.
Charles: Once you narrowed it down to the E&F group, how did you evaluate them?
Heck: We identified eleven candidates and sent them our RFP. From the responses, we cut that group down to just seven and made site visits to all of them. Before we hit the road we worked with our board to prepare a list of questions to keep us focused.
Skorina: I know you don’t want to list the specific firms you passed over, but they include most of the usual suspects in the market, and our readers can fill in the blanks. So what were you looking for? What clinched the deal for Agility?
Heck: We put everything under three general heads: investment process, governance, and fees.
First, process: How do they make money? How do they construct portfolios? How do they monitor and manage risk? Is it just talk, or can they document it and show that it is really working as advertised?
Second, governance: How would they integrate with our investment process? Do they fit with our culture? Is it a stable organization with enough resources? Have they got the kind of controls and safeguards you expect to see in a business that handles other people’s money?
Finally, and very important, fees: Are the fees appropriate, and are they structured in a way that keeps their interests aligned with ours?
We tried to focus on the specific, practical stuff. It’s all very well to say you’re an outsourced CIO, but exactly how are responsibilities allocated and how do we keep everybody in the loop if you’re in another state or another time zone?
As you know, Charles, flying in and out of Muncie, Indiana is not the easiest thing in the world.
Skorina: Let’s see. First you drive two hours to Fort Wayne, right? Then you get on a very small airplane that goes to Chicago, and so on.
Heck: (Laughs) Well, usually it’s an hour-fifteen-minute drive to Indianapolis, but you see my point. What’s the interface? It’s our money, and we don’t necessarily want to wait for the end of the month to find out what’s going on, especially when the market gets as wild as it has been lately.
Who takes our calls? An investor-relations person? A portfolio manager? Is the CEO available to us? What’s the frequency of briefings? Who has the discretion to make decisions? How much input could we have if conditions started to change for us?
And, from a purely self-interested standpoint, what part could I play in the process?
Then we had a bunch of questions: We’ve heard about your investment philosophy, but what did you actually do the day Lehman failed? Or the day of the Japanese earthquake, or the Wall Street flash-crash? Let’s see your trading records and hear what you told your clients.
We also looked hard at the back-office strength, the biographies of the team and what kind of environment they worked in. What is the typical size of the clients? Are they in the billion-dollar club, or smaller funds like us? How exactly do they blend a new fund into their business in terms of both portfolio management and operations?
Last, but far from least: what’s the long-term performance; how does it stack up against the benchmarks and versus in-house managed funds? If your customers haven’t been making at least as much money as their peers, then why are we having this meeting?
It was hard with some firms to really know what they had, what was going on back behind the shiny conference rooms. “Transparency” is everybody’s favorite buzz-word, but you need the attitude to go with it.
We also looked at what kind of growth mode they were in. Some firms are in an asset-building phase. That’s fine, but is growth all they care about? We liked the ones who said that asset management is not an infinitely scalable business and at a certain level, they would feel comfortable and probably not go higher. From our point of view, bigger isn’t necessarily better.
Also, how big a fish are we to them? We’d like to feel that our business is important to them. From that point of view, there’s sort of a just-right size for a potential partner.
I’m afraid this is turning into a ten-part mini-series, Charles. You want to hear more?
Skorina: Absolutely. Most of the information out there is, let’s face it, sales-talk from outsourcers. You never hear about how things look from the customer side. Especially from somebody who’s just been through the process and has the scars to prove it.
Heck: Ok, a few more points, then.
Alignment of interests is something we kept hammering at. We really wanted our partner to have some skin in the game, the same way hedge funds do. We wanted to know we wouldn’t be alone in the foxhole when things went wrong.
Skorina: I can’t close this off without talking about fees again. You’re the customer and you have a budget. You need to know what it costs.
Heck: Again, not easy. There are different formulas, so it’s hard to get clarity and make direct price comparisons among firms. How much do we pay for advice? How much are we paying for overhead? How is a performance fee calculated? For a commingled fund, how are the fees broken out?
We had to understand how returns net-of-fees would look between different firms in different market scenarios, so we could make an intelligent choice.
Something else that’s important: How much does the firm depend on revenue from performance fees versus management fees? You don’t want to over-pay in an up-market. On the other hand, you don’t want them to crash in another down market because their revenue is cut in half and they can’t meet payroll.
Skorina: So, in your case, Agility was the last one standing?
Heck: Yes. There are other good firms out there, and I’m sure every client has their own point of view, but Agility/PWP scored high on all of our specific needs.
They seem to have the talent, the resources, and the process to deliver investment performance in changing market environments.
They also were very receptive to building a process that complement our existing framework, integrating with an internal CIO, and supplying the specific resources that we could not build in-house. Our committee liked their investment philosophy and their organizational culture.
Skorina: Tom, I think this will really help people who are thinking about this. You’ve given them something to chew on. Thanks for taking so much time for me.
I hope you enjoy your big softball game tonight, back in muggy Muncie!
Heck: I’ve enjoyed it Charles. Let me know if you have more questions.
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BSU, UND and Mount Holyoke: Compare, contrast and compute -Two virgin outsourcers and one veteran
The University of North Dakota Foundation also shifted to investment outsourcing this year, at about the same time as Ball State. BSU and UND are both mid-sized, mid-western public schools which, by the usual industry rule-of-thumb, aren’t big enough to justify a professionally-staffed internal investment office. Indeed, neither had a CIO until 2008.
UNDF has a CFO/Treasurer, but no chief investment officer and, since Treasurer Laura Block’s other duties don’t leave her much time to focus on their $122 million endowment, most of the load has fallen on the foundation’s volunteer investment committee and their advisor, Commonfund.
The committee meets four times a year (not in Grand Forks, North Dakota; but in downtown Minneapolis, which is more accessible to out-of-towners). Commonfund reps make recommendations on allocations and the hiring/firing of outside investment managers; the investment committee interviews the recommended managers and ratifies allocation recommendations.
Ball State University had a virtually identical setup for its slightly larger endowment until 2008, when their treasurer, Thomas Heck, was given his current CIO title and Jeffrey Lang got the Treasurer hat. So, Mr. Heck’s current compensation — about $170 thousand, including benefits – was a net increase in investment management overhead for the foundation. That’s about 0.1 percent of AUM.
The stock-market run-up in 2006-2008 had pushed the endowment over $200 million for the first time, and the foundation had even begun a program of direct investment in hedge funds. Their returns in this period were good and, in the fall of 2007 BSUF was even named “Small Non Profit of the Year” by Foundation and Endowment Money Management magazine, based on performance, investment decisions and use of managers/consultants. Their five-year average return at that point was 13.5 percent, vs. 10.7 percent for the S&P. They were also handily beating the 11.5 percent NACUBO five-year average for small endowments.
Life was good in Muncie.
Unfortunately, BSUF’s Hammond-advised portfolio didn’t continue to perform as well in the storms of 2008/2009. By 2010 their five-year return was down to just 1.4 percent. They were still ahead of the S&P, but lagging their peers in the NACUBO small-endowment category, who averaged a 3.0 percent five-year return. In fact, they were below the 25th percentile: three-quarters of their peers were performing better.
The story at UNDF was similar, but worse. In 2006 and 2007 their yearly returns were just slightly behind the NACUBO averages. By fiscal 2010 their five-year return was close to zero, significantly lower than BSUF’s performance and also in the bottom quartile of the NACUBO universe. Those are all nominal returns, of course. The relevant inflation index was 3.4 percent in 2006-2010, so both funds were falling behind that absolute benchmark for all long-term investors.
We note that, of these two similar funds, the one with the in-house CIO did a little better. Even if it’s not statistically valid, Mr. Heck could argue that the 0.1 percent of AUM they paid to run his office bought them an additional 1.4 percent of return vis-à-vis UNDF. Hey, it’s an argument.
UNDF doesn’t publish explicit investment-return figures. Our computations, based on their annual reports, 990 filings, and some information in investment committee minutes, suggest that their five-year average return as of the 2010 fiscal was somewhere between – 0.30 percent and +0.80 percent. We were unable to discuss the matter with Treasurer Laura Block before our publishing date.)
Even a lackluster five-year performance isn’t decisive for an endowment, which can smooth out performance over decades, but it certainly puts real-time pressure on the leadership. We suspect that performance anxiety had a lot to do with pushing both funds into outsourcing when they did.
We also note that neither school chose to give their outsourcing business to their longtime advisor. Both Hammond and Commonfund are marketing themselves as outsourcers (see our list of outsourcers, below) and both tried to retain their accounts. Both were cast off.
UNDF’s Process:
Although we weren’t able to speak at length with the UNDF staff, we did get a peek at their investment committee minutes for the last year, which give a pretty complete story of their outsourcing quest. Although it’s similar to what we heard from Mr. Heck in the interview above, it’s worth recounting, because in this case we can disclose the specific firms who were considered, which ones were passed over, and why.
Commonfund had been UNDF’s advisor since 2005, but in October, 2010, investment committee chair Jennifer Neppel pushed to do an RFP for a new firm, noting that there had been “issues” with a Commonfund real estate fund, and issues of due diligence going back to a freeze in a short-term money fund (presumably, in the panic of 2008). It was subsequently made clear that the committee was looking for “implemented” advice, specifically including a manager-of-managers capability. They couldn’t “outsource” the CIO they didn’t have, but they wanted, at a minimum, to outsource the manager-selection process, which weighed on the time of their committee members.
The names Cambridge, Commonfund, Northern Trust, Investure, Hammond Associates, JPM, SEI, Russell, TIAA-CREF (CoVariance) were all initially mentioned as possibilities.
In a January meeting, Cambridge and Investure were removed from the RFP list for no specified reasons. Four firms not previously mentioned were also deleted from an RFP: Buckingham Asset, Wilshire, Goldman Sachs and Fund Evaluation Group (FEG). Again, no specific reasons were given, except for Buckingham, which was said to have no active (as opposed to passive) investment strategies, offered no guidance to alternatives, and had only two nonprofit clients in UND’s AUM class.
In March, five of the eleven RFP respondents were eliminated: JPMorgan, Hammond, CoVariance, Morgan Creek, and TIFF. JP Morgan was criticized on price. Their fees were said to be 1 percent higher than others. Also, they provided no references and did not answer questions re fraudulent hedge funds [sic] and gave no current performance data. Hammond did not appear to have the outsourced CIO model UNDF was seeking, and their reporting was not AIMR-compliant. (AIMR = old name for what is now called GIPS, a set of performance-reporting standards widely used by institutional asset managers.)
The CoVariance unit of TIAA-CREF was just starting operations and “had no record to rely on.” Morgan Creek did not provide performance information, and their strong focus on alternatives didn’t look like a good fit for UNDF. TIFF also was thought to be too heavy on alternatives for the committee’s tastes. Also, they used commingled funds and might not have ability to structure a customized portfolio.
Four of the remaining RFP respondents were invited to interview: Commonfund, Northern Trust, SEI, and Russell. The minutes implied that the invitation to Commonfund was mainly a courtesy to their current advisor. Obviously, they were not satisfied with their performance, or they would not have initiated the search process but, as a practical matter, they would need their cooperation during a transition.
A key criterion for the finalists was their demonstrated “manager-of-managers” capability, which would alleviate the investment committee from having to interview outside managers.
Russell was said to have the focus, expertise and strong performance they wanted. They also liked Russell’s relationship manager,
Chrissie Fortmeyer. They were impressed with SEI’s research strength and its performance history.
Commonfund, SEI, Russell, and Northern Trust were all interviewed in one day in April, and SEI was selected by a unanimous vote.
At the July meeting the SEI rep presented an analysis of the UNDF portfolio and their transition plan. The most notable changes in allocation seemed to be a proposed shift from ex-US equity to high-yield ex-US bonds; and a shift to a smaller (but supposedly more efficient) inflation-hedge allocation. Overall, the portfolio’s fixed-income allocation would nearly double, from 10 percent to 19 percent.
We’ve discussed two recent outsourcing decisions in some detail. For comparison, we could note another endowment which was an early-adopter: Mount Holyoke College, the toney private school in Massachusetts, moved to out-sourcing five years ago.
Mount Holyoke’s $540 million endowment sits just above the $100 to $500 million bracket occupied by BSUF and UNDF. Like UNDF, they have never had an on-campus investment office although they are (marginally) big enough to support one. Like UNDF they are not, strictly, CIO-outsourcing, but they are offloading more investment management from their board-members to their advisors and are certainly paying more for “implemented advisory services” beyond what Cambridge routinely supplies its clients. Judging by their recent performance, it’s been worth it.
Unlike UND and BSU, which both dropped their advisors, Holyoke chose to keep their previous advisor, Cambridge, but pay for more services. Cambridge billed them about $1.2 million in FY 2009, when the endowment pool stood at $499 million, or about 0.23% percent of AUM. By contrast, Hammond billed BSUF $170,000 for advising their $146 million endowment in 2010, about 0.12 percent for pure advisory services.
If these numbers are representative, then “outsource” means “we get twice as much.”
Although we can’t draw conclusions from anecdotes, and Holyoke’s superior performance can’t be ascribed just to the outsourcing model, it’s interesting to note that the outsourced Ivy-ish endowment in this group has run well ahead of its country cousins. At least in this one case, the premium paid for outsourcing seems justified by higher returns.
Five-year Investment Returns: FY 2006-2010:
BSUF: 1.4 percent
UNDF: 0.0 percent (estimated)
MtHol: 5.5 percent
NACUBO: 3.0 percent
S&P: -0.8 percent
Inflation: 3.4 percent
Different Strokes:
If any conclusion can be drawn from these mini-case-studies, it might be just that every fund is different on a host of dimensions. Culture, history and personal predilections have as much to do with whether you keep your CIO down the hall or across the country, or dispense with him/her altogether and rely on some smart, dedicated volunteers. Rules-of-thumb based on AUM are too crude to explain what’s going on.
In a future report, we’ll consider some counter-examples: small, un-outsourced funds which are doing just fine.
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Skorina’s Ultimate Outsourcer List (45)
AUM is discretionary unless otherwise noted
Skorina’s Ultimate Outsourcer List (45)
AUM is discretionary unless otherwise noted
Agility (Perella Weinberg), New York, NY, Christopher Bittman CIO, AUM over $2 billion.
Angeles Investment Advisors, Santa Monica, CA, Leslie B. Kautz Founder & Principal, AUM $35 billion total advisory, $1 billion discretionary.
Balentine, Atlanta, GA, Robert Balentine CEO, AUM $900 million.
BlackRock, New York, NY, Nancy Everett Managing Director – Head of U.S. Fiduciary Management Solutions, AUM $39 billion.
Cambridge Associates, Boston, MA, Deirdre Nectow Managing Director, AUM $107 billion total advisory, $5.7 billion total discretionary, many custom programs.
Clearbrook Financial, Princeton, NJ, Fred Weiss Managing Director, AUM $30 billion advisory.
Commonfund, Wilton, CT, Sarah E. Clark Managing Director, AUM $12 billion discretionary, $8 billion fully outsourced.
CornerStone Partners, Charlottesville, VA, Don Laing Sr Partner, AUM over $3 billion.
Covariance Capital Management (TIAA-CREF), Houston, TX, Shannon Morton Managing Director, AUM $1billion.
Fiduciary Management Associates, Chicago, IL, Robert L. Hudon, Jr. Chief Marketing Officer, AUM $2 billion.
Fund Evaluation Group (FEG), Cincinnati, OH, Gary Price Managing Principal, AUM $1.9 billion.
Fiduciary Research & Consulting (FRC), San Francisco, CA, John Boich, President and Chief Investment Officer, AUM $7 billion.
Global Endowment Management, Charlotte, NC, Stephanie Lynch Partner, AUM $3.5 billion.
Goldman Sachs, New York, NY, Chris Kojima, Managing Director, AUM not available.
Hall Capital Partners, San Francisco, CA, Richard (Rick) Grand-Jean Managing Director Institutional, AUM $22.4 billion total advisory, $2.7 billion institutional discretionary.
Hewitt EnnisKnupp, Chicago, IL, Stephen T. Cummings, AUM $13.4 billion.
HighVista, Boston, MA, Brian Chu Partner, AUM over $3.5 billion.
Hirtle Callaghan, West Conshohocken, PA, Nicole Kraus Director Institutional, AUM $20 billion.
Investure, Charlottesville, VA, Alice Handy CIO, AUM $8.5 billion.
JPMorganChase, New York, NY, Monica Issar Head of endowment & foundation strategic advisory group, AUM $1.2 trillion global discretionary.
Makena, Menlo Park, CA Eric Upin CIO, Bill Miller Partner & head of client relations, AUM $15 billion.
Mercer-Hammond, St. Louis, MO, AUM $51 billion.
Russ LaMore, Partner
Carla McGuire, Partner
Kimberly Wood, Partner, Chicago
Mangham Associates, Charlottesville, VA, Joel R. Mangham, Principal & Founder, AUM $2.3 billion.
Morgan Creek Capital Management, Chapel Hill, NC, Mark Yusko CEO & CIO, AUM $10 billion.
Morgan Stanley (Graystone Consulting), New York, NY, Halvard Kvaale Managing Director Portfolio Advisory Services (MSSB), AUM $22 billion.
NEPC, Cambridge, MA, Steve Charlton Partner, AUM $2.2 billion.
New Providence Asset Management, New York, NY, Lance Odden Managing Director, AUM $2.25 billion.
Northern Trust, Chicago, IL, Thomas R. Benzmiller Managing Executive – Program Solutions for institutions over $250 million, Kendall L. Kay Sr Vice President – Segment Head for institutions $250 million or less, AUM $38 billion discretionary.
Okabena Advisors, Minneapolis, MN, James A. Norungolo Managing Director, AUM 1.3 billion.
Partners Capital, Boston, MA, (London, UK), Will Fox, Head of North America, AUM $2.8 billion.
Post Rock Advisors, New York, NY, Carol B. Einiger President, AUM not available.
Pyramis Global Advisors, Smithfield, RI, Michael Barnett EVP institutional sales, AUM $6.7 billion.
Rogerscasey, Darien, CT, Adam Tosh CIO and Robert Zeidman client relations, AUM $12.5 billion advisory.
Russell Investments, Seattle, WA, Joseph Gelly, Jr. Managing Director investment outsourcing solutions, AUM $75.7 billion.
Salient Partners, Houston, TX, David Hicks Partner, AUM$8.5 billion.
SEI, Oaks, PA, Paul Klauder Vice President institutional group, AUM $54 billion.
Spider Management Company, Richmond, VA, Srinivas (Srini) Pulavarti, CIO, AUM $2 billion.
Spruce Private Investors, Stamford, CT, John Bailey CEO, AUM $3.2 billion.
State Street Global Advisors (Office of the Fiduciary Advisor), Boston, MA, Kathleen Mann & Matt Kelley nonprofit outsourcing, AUM $41 billion.
Strategic Investment Group, Arlington, VA, Deborah D. Boedicker Partner, AUM $28.1 billion, 70% discretionary.
Towers Watson, New York, NY, Tom Brust Head of business development, AUM $50 billion.
The Fund for Foundations (TIFF), West Conshohocken, PA, Laurence H. Lebowitz president & CIO, AUM $8.2 billion discretionary.
UBS AG, Chicago, IL, William Drobny, Head of Institutional Marketing, AUM $12.8 billion.
Wilshire Associates, Santa Monica, CA, Julia K. Bonafede President of Wilshire Consulting, AUM $11 billion.
Wurts & Associates, Seattle, WA, Jeffrey MacLean CEO, AUM $1.2 billion.
